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INTRODUCTION 
An attempt to summarize Tom Stoppard in a nutshell is an exercise in futility and must be 
abandoned at once. In the forty years since Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead catapulted 
him into becoming an overnight success,1 Stoppard’s style has been characterized as being 
absurdist, postmodernist, emotionally distant, philosophical, political, intellectual, and 
undoubtedly described with a few more adjectives. Every time a new label gets slapped onto one 
of his works, Stoppard has the tendency to wiggle out of the characterization by churning out a 
new, genre-defying piece, and it seems to me that the only commonality within his works is that 
they all display elements of Stoppardianism.2  
Most of Stoppard’s plays feature moments of immense theatricality, and his mastery 
exists in creating visuals that baffle and enrapture his audience.3 He is very cognizant of the 
magic that can be created without words, and in a lecture titled “The Event and the Text,” he 
provides an anecdote of an amateur production in Cambridge which he personally never got a 
chance to see: 
This production of The Tempest took place in the open air in the 
early evening, and when it became time for Ariel to leave the 
action of the play he turned and ran up the stage, away from the 
audience. Now the stage was a lawn, and the lawn backed on to a 
lake. He ran across the grass and got to the edge of the lake, and he 
just kept running, because the director had had the foresight to put 
a plank walkway just underneath the surface of the water. So you 
                                                 
1 Stoppard had in fact been a struggling writer, and termed himself “mainly self-unemployed” for seven years before 
his career took off in 1967 (Fleming, Finding Order Amidst Chaos, 13). 
2 Term coined by William Demastes in The Cambridge Introduction to Tom Stoppard (3). 
3 The opening scene of Jumpers dazzles its audience with a trapeze swinger doing a strip-tease, while acrobats and 
gymnasts form a human pyramid. After Magritte is famous for the curtain ascending to a stage full of characters in 
seemingly absurd poses, although it is later revealed that there is a perfectly logical explanation for them.  
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have to imagine: it’s become dusk, and quite a lot of the artificial 
lighting has come on, and back there in the gloom is the lake. And 
Ariel says his last words and he turns and he runs and gets to the 
water and he runs and goes splish splash, splish splash, right across 
the lake and into the enfolding dark, until one can only just hear his 
footsteps making these little splashes and then ultimately his little 
figure disappeared from you … This is the thing, you can’t write 
anything as good as that. If you look it up, it says ‘Exit, Ariel’ 
       (Delaney, 200) 
Influenced by the effect produced by the lights and walkway, Stoppard puts a great deal of 
thought and effort into the staging of his plays. Evidence of this can be seen in his painstaking 
placement of relatively irrelevant props (say a bucket that Hilary throws up into in The Hard 
Problem) in a position which maximizes the comic effect of a scene.4  
A firm believer of the literary tactic of constructing “lines, characters and whole plots [to] 
reappear all the time to remind us that evolution is a matter of reproduction,” Stoppard recycles 
old texts in many of his works (Fleming, “Tom Stoppard: A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man,” 40).5 He presents his audience with “familiar literary language made strange by an 
unfamiliar dramatic context,” thus inviting them to appraise a situation from a perspective 
different from an inherently myopic one (Kelly, “Introduction: Tom Stoppard in 
Transformation,” 10). Oftentimes, he works in the opposite direction, presenting a bizarre 
situation which on further explication has a perfectly rational conception.6 Referring to Jumpers, 
Stoppard recounts how “we see a man carrying a tortoise in one hand, and a bow and arrow in 
                                                 
4 Stoppard mentions that “the joke didn’t land” until the bucket – a reference to the threat of projectile vomiting in a 
previous scene – was placed on the bed right between Spike and Hilary. 
5 Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead uses entire scenes from Shakespeare’s Hamlet, while Travesties features 
excerpts from Joyce’s Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, as well as Oscar Wilde’s The Importance of Being Earnest. 
6 See footnote #3.  
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the other, his face covered in shaving foam. A trick I enjoy very much is when, bit by bit, you 
build up something ludicrous – and then someone walks in” (Gussow, Conversations, 7-8). 
Employed to a subtler extent in Hapgood, the appearance of Celia Newton (Elizabeth’s twin) is a 
disconcerting moment for the audience, but as will be discussed later, it serves the purpose of 
driving home the point of the play. Not only does this add to theatricality but it also serves to 
embody one of Stoppard’s main preoccupations, that of rationality commingled with 
unconventional ideation, all seeking to somehow understand human existence.  
After experimenting with several mediums, Stoppard concluded that he preferred writing 
dialogue, saying that “the whole point of writing plays is that you can’t contradict yourself in 
public without becoming less than respectable” (Delaney, 36). This trope is visible in a lot of the 
witty dialectics in his plays where he extends an argument as far as possible without committing 
to either side, then transforms the situation with a convenient interruption so that the discourse is 
left on a caesura,7 Stoppard makes use of this technique for precisely the reason that he doesn’t 
want to commit to a specific school of thought, and to him, uncertainty rather than definitiveness 
is a virtue.  
Along with his tool for self-contradiction is Stoppard’s uncanny precision with words, 
which leads the audience down a rabbit hole of puns and misconstruction of meaning. 
Manipulated to its maximum degree in Arcadia, this method not only lends some of its 
characters a distinctly Wildean flavor, but leads to a “way of argument and rebuttal, [revealing] 
that language both is and is not up to the tasks it is generally intended to perform” (Demastes, 
28).  
                                                 
7 Examples are visible in The Hard Problem, which will be examined later, as well as in Travesties between Joyce 
and Tzara. 
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Given that Stoppard explores topics ranging from the existential ramblings of two minor 
characters from Hamlet, to playwrights experiencing love and loss, to nineteenth-century 
Russian intelligentsia, any discussion of his works necessitates choosing a subset that involves a 
common theme. This paper will target plays that deal primarily with scientific principles, and 
although some of Stoppard’s earlier works hint at issues like probability, biology, and the 
concept of infinity, I focus on three plays that hinge upon scientific discoveries made over the 
past century.  
For a writer of fiction, a story is the outcome of imagination; for a scientist, a conclusion 
is the outcome of a conjecture. The two processes are similar in the sense that they both involve 
some degree of speculation. Stoppard is the quintessential imaginative artist who married his 
artistic vision with the precision of a scientist. He is known to manipulate a familiar situation by 
introducing an element of speculation, and then indulging in a dialectic that tickles the intellect 
but remains unresolved. Imagine a die, except instead of numbers it has the following scientific 
concepts scrawled on its sides:  
1 Genetic Determinism 
2 Chaos Theory  
3 Quantum Mechanics,  
4 Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem,  
5 Positional Geometry 
6 Thermodynamics.  
Now imagine Stoppard sitting at a desk, rolling the die exactly twice, and then formulating a play 
based on those two motifs, somehow connecting it to reality and emphasizing the 
meaningfulness of life. Arcadia (1993), Hapgood (1988), and The Hard Problem (2015) are the 
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product of this little exercise, except that Stoppard has been rolling the die around in his head 
since before Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead even got staged!8  
Referring to the reception of Stoppard’s scientifically-oriented plays, John Fleming 
claims that “critics find the sheer amount of intellectual material one must know (or absorb) in 
order to fully appreciate a Stoppard play to be off-putting” (Fleming, “Tom Stoppard’s Arcadia,” 
24). However, Clive James, a reluctant theater-goer, looks at the dynamism of Stoppard’s plays, 
and analyzes Stoppard from the perspective of relativity, arguing his style is analogous in the 
sense that it eliminates the possibility of a viewpoint at rest. “Here and now in Stoppard is a time 
and place defined by an infinite number of converging vectors each heading towards it at the 
speed of light and steadily slowing down to nothing before passing through it and speeding up 
again,” and used in the context of Zeno’s paradox that Stoppard stages in Jumpers,9 he mentions 
that “there is a fear in it – the awe of watching a slow approach down long perspectives” (73). 
The here and now in Stoppard’s plays is relative: sometimes represented through the failing 
memory of a senile amnesiac, while at other times the here is held fixed in space while the now 
oscillates between centuries.10 The reason why this reading on Stoppardianism is relevant is 
because James ends the essay by saying that “it might be only in Stoppard’s enchanted 
playground that the magical inevitability of General Relativity can be reconciled with the 
Uncertainty Principle or quantum physics,” and the three scientific plays together work towards 
that very reconciliation (76). 
 
                                                 
8 Summarizing a point in Lord Malquist and Mr. Moon (1966), Clive James says that “Moon is appalled by the shift 
of a glacier that leads to a man straightening his tie”, which is an example of the butterfly effect, a phenomenon 
Stoppard explore in Arcadia (1993).  
9 George Moore the philosopher tries to illustrate the Zeno’s paradox of infinite points in finite distances “which 
showed in every way but experience that an arrow could never reach its target.”  
10 Henry Carr’s befuddled memory is the space in which Travesties gets staged. Arcadia is set in a similar space 
across two literary time periods. 
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ARCADIA 
   
  
 
Then maths left the real world behind, just like modern art, really. 
Nature was classical, maths was suddenly Picassos. But now 
nature is having the last laugh. The freaky stuff is turning out to be 
the mathematics of the real world.      
      (Valentine to Hannah,65) 
 
Stoppard’s reputation for speculating and subsequently reformulating a familiar situation 
into an unfamiliar one gets further validated in Arcadia, as he uses the characteristics of literary 
history in contrast to those in the contemporary world to examine and question the seemingly 
irreconcilable differences between the two. The play opens in Sidley Park (a country home in 
Derbyshire) at the cusp of the Enlightenment and Romantic periods, occasionally leaping 
forward into the modern world so that the narrative is split temporally but proceeds in parallel, 
allowing Stoppard to project the philosophical preoccupations of each period on the other. 
Featuring a bare and minimalistic stage layout common to both periods, the long central table 
accumulates props through the course of the play, and characters literally reach through time to 
pick up and use fragments in the space-time continuum. This thematic trope introduces an 
element of dramatic irony because although the events indigenous to each period unfold linearly, 
the chronology isn’t mirrored and information gets recovered in haphazard fragments, lending a 
chaotic impression to the plot progression. Chaos in the narrative structure is orchestrated, 
corresponding directly to its content, and using that as its background the play explores the 
unpredictability and irreversibility of time, the desire for order and their subsequent effect on 
human relations. 
PREMISE 
Aristocrats in the year 1809 could afford to spend exorbitant amounts of money on employees 
ranging from butlers to stable boys. They could also afford to host multiple guests for extended 
periods of time and go hunting on their grounds for leisure, all the while reminiscing fondly 
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about the age of enlightenment. In 1993, not even the Lady Croom is exempt from industry and 
needs to do research in order to establish a name for herself outside of her nominal title. The 
modern world has no time for wooing and seduction, for learning how to waltz while also doing 
algebra because status is acquired through specialization in a field, and a continual churning of 
information is necessary to remain afloat in the intellectual community. Nonetheless, a reverence 
for the past is pervasive in the modern context of the play. Hannah has a published book on 
Caroline Lamb,1 and yet she’s back at work to write a new book about the Sidley hermit, 
gathering as much information as possible while simultaneously helping Lady Croom with 
research on gardening history. Valentine uses all the game books and family legacy to work on 
population dynamics, and has friends who analyze linguistics and sentence structures to try and 
link authors to anonymous works. Bernard Nightingale too is a researcher, enamored by the 
poetry of the Romantic period and housing a burning desire for fame. The common trait in all of 
them is their obsession with history, which is all too similar to the characters of the earlier 
portrayed period and their preoccupation with all things classical and ‘regular’.  
While working out the mechanics of the play, Stoppard was reportedly “thinking about 
Romanticism and Classicism as opposites in style, taste, temperament, art . . . [but that] the 
romantic temperament has a classical person wildly signaling, and vice versa” (Fleming, Finding 
Order Amidst Chaos, 194). However, more-so than temperaments, I think the dialectic of past 
and projected developments in science (not to mention the fortuitous fact that Newtonian physics 
began to get destabilized right around the early nineteenth century) lends the play its 
                                                 
1 Caroline Lamb is famous for her affair with Lord Byron, and the description of him being “mad, bad and 
dangerous to know” is attributed to her. In this play, Hannah has written a book Caro through a feministic 
perspective, wherein “Byron [is] the spoilt child promoted by his gifts by the spirit of the age [and] Caroline [is] the 
closet intellectual shafted by a male society” (Stoppard, Arcadia, 85). 
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contemplative richness and a binding structure. That “shifting scientific paradigm” was an 
excellent parallel to the differences between classic and romantic temperaments, and Stoppard 
chose to double the mirroring effect by surveying it between the two periods, as well as within 
them (Fleming, 195). 
EMOTION ACROSS THE AGES 
The action in the nineteenth century begins with a clear demarcation between childhood and 
adult tendencies, providing a contrast in receptivity and resilience to change, but the three-year 
span of the narrative blurs the lines between the two. Keeping in line with period conventions of 
the aristocracy, adult relationships are rife with scandal. Almost every factor that contributes to 
moving the narrative forward has sexual undertones, and even Culpability Noakes2 – whose sole 
ambition is to convert the pristine landscape into ruinous crags – contributes to furthering gossip 
about illicit sexual behavior in the household.  
Thirteen-year-old Thomasina Coverly on the other hand, expresses an innocent apathy 
towards carnality, castigating the historical figure of Cleopatra for “making such noodles of [her] 
sex,” preferring to focus instead on her geometry and Latin. Compared to the adults in the 
household who are appalled by the imminent and seemingly unnecessary changes to Sidley Park, 
Thomasina embraces the transformation from “an Englishman’s garden [to] a haunt of Corsican 
brigands,” complimenting Noakes’ plans as being those of a Salvator3 (Stoppard, Arcadia, 20). 
Three years down the line however, we see Thomasina wanting to marry Lord Byron, seeming to 
subscribe to the conventions of society; one cannot help but wonder if every young girl descends 
the same path and gets calcified into a borderline ignorant, inflexible Lady of the Manor figure 
                                                 
2 Lady Croom puns on Capability Brown, one the most famous landscape gardener of the eighteenth century. 
3 Salvator Rosa, a Baroque Italian painter renowned for being ‘proto -Romantic.’ 
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that her mother typifies. These apprehensions are easily dispelled when we see that Thomasina is 
no ordinary child and exhibits a remarkable understanding and intuition of scientific theories and 
their implications.  
Depicted in sharp contrast to the earlier period is the muted sexuality of the modern 
characters. Chloe is probably the only character who can verbalize her emotion and notice 
indications of it in others. The rest are either too shy and attempt to express themselves using 
tokens like bicycles (her mother) and apples (Gus), or are too captivated by their research to 
focus elsewhere. In fact, most instances of passion portrayed in the modern period are driven by 
heated arguments about research content, practices, and methodology.  
This observation about the range of sexual expression is relevant because Stoppard has 
been criticized for the excessive intellectual content of his work at the expense of real emotion. 
Although his inhibitions about expressing his thoughts on love did lessen over time and are 
manifested more directly in The Real Thing and The Invention of Love, Stoppard’s understanding 
of emotion as an incentive for action is fairly ubiquitous in Arcadia. On discovering that 
Septimus Hodge gave “the charming spirited” Mrs. Chater “a perpendicular poke in the gazebo,” 
her infuriated husband challenged Septimus to a duel (Arcadia, 15-16). However, his desire for 
fame and for a good review of his novel overrode his fit of jealousy, leading to a temporary truce 
between the two men. A similar fit of jealousy, but this time commingled with a sense of hurt 
and betrayal (Lord Byron, whom she fancied, was also having relations with Mrs. Chater) causes 
Lady Croom to kick the entire party of guests out of her manor.  
ART VERSUS SCIENCE 
In the modern context, arguments about the importance and relevance of their work cause shifts 
in the characters’ priorities and sense of identity. Bernard the stubborn professor of literature is 
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convinced that he has made a significant discovery about Lord Byron that will propel him into 
prominence. Despite cautions from both Hannah and Valentine, he discards the need for hard 
evidence to back his claims, using a probabilistic approach instead. When he “jeeringly” 
dismisses Valentine’s objection to his practice of drawing conclusions and ignoring 
contradictory evidence, things get ugly.  
Valentine (casually) Well, it’s all trivial anyway 
Bernard What is? 
Valentine Who wrote what when . . .  
Bernard Trivial? 
Valentine Personalities  
… 
Bernard Oh you’re going to zap me with penicillin and pesticides. Spare me that and I’ll 
spare you the bomb and aerosols. But don’t confuse progress with perfectibility. A great 
poet is always timely. A great philosopher is an urgent need. There’s no rush for Isaac 
Newton. We were quite happy with Aristotle’s cosmos. Personally I preferred it. Fifty-
five crystal spheres geared to God’s crankshaft is my idea of a satisfying universe. I can’t 
think of anything more trivial than the speed of light. Quarks, quasars – big bangs, black 
holes – who gives a shit?  
… 
Valentine (to Chloe) He’s not against penicillin, and he knows I’m not against poetry. (to 
Bernard) I’ve given up on the grouse.       
(Stoppard, Arcadia, 86-88) 
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In their attempt to take a stand for their respective fields, Bernard and Valentine get polarized 
into saying things they don’t even mean. The emotional effect of this conversation influences 
Valentine to lose hope and give up on his graduate research in population dynamics because he 
loses faith in his ability to uncover the underlying pattern. At the same time, their conversation 
serves to exemplify the resistance to change in the face of a longstanding convention. Bernard’s 
comment about preferring the Aristotelian concept of the cosmos gets to the heart of what the 
play explores, especially through the perspective of children as opposed to adults. The age divide 
is why Thomasina accepts the impending doom of the world with cheerfulness whereas it drives 
Septimus into a frenzy he never recovers from. However, as Hannah points out, “English 
landscape was invented by gardeners imitating foreign painters who were evoking classical 
authors,” and the only thing that has remained constant through time is the desire for change in 
the direction of the ideal, or progress, as is with science (40). 
DEFYING CONVENTIONS: A COPERNICAN THOMASINA 
The trajectory of scientific progress has never been smooth, because it has necessitated humans 
to shift away from a deified perspective of themselves into one that involves apes. Stoppard 
allows his play to unfold in a similar manner, wherein he has Thomasina begin posing innocuous 
questions, which over the course of the narrative blossom into powerful ideas that anticipate 
leaps in scientific history spanning centuries, and hence require a massive adaptation of 
mentality in a classical audience. While stirring jam into her rice pudding, Thomasina makes the 
observation that “if you stir backward, the jam will not come together again” to which Septimus 
has the logical answer that one “cannot stir things apart [because] time must needs run 
backward” (Stoppard, Arcadia, 12). This doesn’t silence the whirring gears in Thomasina’s 
mind, and on the contrary, she draws a conclusion about the deterministic nature of the universe. 
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Simply put, if the universe were to be a Newtonian wherein every action has an equal, opposing 
reaction, “you could stop every atom in its position and direction, and … if you were really, 
really good at algebra you could write the formula for all the future,” and so begins Thomasina’s 
quest to uncover the mysteries of the world (13). Exciting and overwhelming as it is, Thomasina 
neglects to acknowledge the flip side to this model of the universe, namely the question of free 
will. Were the universe to be deterministic, and were every atom to be Newtonian, humans 
would be enslaved to their internal chemistry and be unable to control even their own decisions. 
Stoppard conveniently side-steps that question on a scientific level – raising it in The Hard 
Problem instead – and explores its effect within human interactions. 
Complicating matters even further is Stoppard’s engagement with the art of the plausible, 
and the relevance of that to the scientific issues explored in this play. In an effort to distract her 
while he attends to businesses of carnality and duels, Septimus assigns Thomasina the (nearly) 
impossible task of finding the proof to Fermat’s last theorem,4 the pursuit of every 
mathematician given this frustrating fact: 
Septimus In the margin of his copy of Arithmetica, Fermat wrote that he had discovered 
a wonderful proof of his theorem but, the margin being too narrow for his purpose, did 
not have room to write it down. The note was found after his death, and from that day to 
this –  
Thomasina Oh! I see now! The answer is perfectly obvious. 
Septimus This time you may have overreached yourself. 
… 
                                                 
4 The Diophantine equation, xn+yn = zn is an extension of the Pythagoras theorem. Fermat’s last theorem states that 
this equation has no solution for n > 2. A proof was finally formulated by Andrew Wiles in 1995 for which he won 
the Field’s medal. 
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Thomasina There is no proof, Septimus. The thing that is perfectly obvious is that the 
note in the margin was a joke to make you all mad.       
        (Stoppard, Arcadia, 14) 
It is entirely plausible that Fermat’s intention was to make future mathematicians mad, or that he 
couldn’t admit to having no proof to his own theorem. Were this to be true, it would mean not 
only that Fermat was a sadistic mathematician with an ego problem but also that when people are 
informed about the existence of a thing, they don’t rest until they find it. Philosophy and science 
were conceived, and continue to exist because we are still on the quest to find the meaning of 
life, even if there is possibility that the hunt is futile.  
The possibility of the futility and/or triviality of the hunt is one that plagues Valentine. 
Along with his cynical “Oh the grouse. The damned grouse” he mentions his belief in the 
plausibility of the afterlife, and Hannah shoots back with “It’s wanting to know that makes us 
matter . . . Believe in the after, by all means, but not the life. Believe in God, the soul, the spirit, 
the infinite, believe in angels if you like, but not in the celestial get-together for an exchange of 
views. If the answers are in the back of a book I can wait, but what a drag” (106). Hannah’s 
views are echoed later in The Hard Problem as well, and they serve to emphasize the necessity 
for people to continue their quest for knowledge, despite the fact that it may shake up previously 
held notions.  
After centuries of classical physics governing the scientific world, a different set of rules 
invaded the space. “Relativity and quantum physics looked as if they were going to clean out the 
whole problem between them. A theory of everything. But they only described the very big and 
the very small. The ordinary sized stuff which is our lives … [is] as mysterious to us as the 
heavens were to the Greeks” (68-69). In the spirit of her time, Thomasina seeks to describe the 
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ordinary that surrounded her life. Disillusioned with the banality of Euclidean geometry, 
Thomasina believes that “if there is an equation for a curve like a bell, there must be an equation 
for one like a bluebell, and if a bluebell, why not a rose?” because otherwise “God could only 
make a cabinet” (55). This revelation leads to her attempting to develop “a method whereby all 
forms of nature must give up their numerical secrets and draw themselves through number 
alone,” which in the present world describes Fractal Geometry (55). Valentine of the twentieth 
century, and mathematician of Sidley Park explains that her method “starts with an equation and 
turns it into a graph [whereas he has] got a graph and [he’s] trying to find the equation that 
would give you the graph if you used it in the way she’s used hers. Iterated it” (65). Much like 
the position of an electron in Hapgood, the equation works such that “you’d never know when to 
expect the next dot. But gradually you’d start to see this shape, because every dot would be 
inside the shape of this leaf” (68).5 In a sense there is an algorithm that describes the future of the 
position of a point, but there is an inherent uncertainty to it that opens the closed doors of 
determinism into a range of possibilities for exploration.  
Valentine is very excited by the pursuit of the unknown, saying that “the unpredictable 
and predetermined unfold together to make everything the way it is. It’s how nature creates 
itself, the snowflake and the snowstorm” (68). These describe dynamical systems in nature, 
where a system in a stable state can suddenly and unpredictably bifurcate into an oscillatory or 
unstable state. Every once in a while, it bifurcates multiple times, doubling, tripling and 
quadrupling its period ad infinitum until the system looks like it is in utter chaos6. However, 
because of the equation governing it all, there is an order amongst that chaotic behavior. The 
                                                 
5 See Figure 1 An algorithm iterated ten thousand times to produce a self-similar leaf. 
6 Similar to the self-regenerating heads of the Lernean Hydra from the second labor of Hercules.  
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consequence of orderly patterns among chaos implies that “six thousand years in the Sahara 
looks like six months in Manchester,” that is, the pattern is the same, but the scale is vastly 
different (69). This idea had an immense metaphoric appeal to Stoppard because not only did it 
give him an opportunity to represent human life as a series of seemingly random events, but it 
also gave him the freedom to condense two centuries worth of scientific discoveries to three 
years of a young girl’s life. 
DISCARDING THE NEWTONIAN UNIVERSE 
Mathematically speaking, Bernard sees things as a binary and that the probability of getting a 
zero or a one is dictated by hard probabilities. Hannah, on the other hand, is open to considering 
multiple explanations for a problem, and hence exhibits a more scientific outlook towards life. 
While reading up on her own research she finds out that “the hermit [of Sidley Park] was born in 
the same year as Septimus Hodge” leading to her hypothesis that maybe Septimus was the hermit 
who went insane. However, unlike Bernard who rushes to be featured on “The Breakfast Hour” 
as soon as he suspects Byron of murder, Hannah waits until she stumbles upon a picture of 
Septimus holding Plautus (his tortoise) before publishing anything (Stoppard, Arcadia, 94,126). 
The interesting thing about the way their personalities get manifested is that since Hannah is a 
great admirer of the classical, and Bernard a romantic, one expects her to be rigidly Newtonian in 
her approach and him to be open to irregularity. However, Fleming says “while Bernard’s 
arrogance and lust for fame are obvious character flaws, his more subtle shortcoming is that his 
sought-after explanation is based on a Newtonian paradigm of complete order; that is, it ignores 
the complexities and contradictions of real life,” and that essentially, he assumes a strict linearity 
of cause and effect (Fleming, 202).  
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On dissecting Bernard’s argument, it is unsurprising that he leaps to the conclusion that 
Byron murdered Chater. That Chater’s notes addressed to Septimus were left in a book that he 
lent to Byron, and that Byron did have relations with Mrs. Chater but it caused grief not to her 
husband, but to Lady Croom, are details that fell through the cracks in history.  Verbal 
information cannot possibly be as extensive as written records, and it is a misalignment of 
knowledge that led to Bernard’s fiasco. Stoppard refers to this lack of synchronization in a less 
direct form as he employs the use of translation of Latin into English. The first instance is of 
Lady Croom misinterpreting “Et in Arcadia Ego” to depict God’s unchanging plan for paradise 
when instead it refers to the omnipresence of death (Stoppard, Arcadia, 23). “Oh phooey to 
death” exclaims Thomasina, showing a maturity beyond her years for the inevitability of an end 
and an emphasis on the present (25). The second instance again involves Thomasina, except in 
this case it is an exercise of retranslating Shakespeare from Latin unbeknownst to her, wherein 
the crudity of her translation renders the passage abysmally prosaic. That the delicate balance of 
language and expression can be thwarted by a simple doing and undoing of an action is further 
validation of the fact that God is not Newtonian. A mistranslation caused the atom bomb to be 
dropped in Japan,7 and a gardening record attributing the discovery of a new species of dahlia to 
Ezra Chater caused Bernard’s public humiliation. The smallest of actions can have unpredictable 
effects and it is this aspect of the ordinary that makes life worth living. 
Septimus was not aware of the unpredictable determinism that rules the natural world and 
went “off his head,” covering reams of paper with “cabalistic proofs that the world was coming 
to an end” (43). To be sure, Thomasina’s fractal geometry gets at that very concept but the 
                                                 
7 The Japanese word mokusatsu literally translates to “kill with silence.” When issued an ultimatum by the US, the 
Japanese responded with this word, intending it to mean ‘reserving comment,’ but was misinterpreted as them 
ignoring the ultimatum. See The Fall of Japan by William Craig. 
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notion of iterating towards irregularity subsumes the unpredictability inherent to the mechanism. 
Her other question, however, the one concerning the deterministic nature of the world gets 
developed further when Septimus hands her a recent publication, and Thomasina, thumping the 
book down on the table goes: 
Thomasina Well! Just as I said! Newton’s machine which would knock our atoms from 
cradle to grave is incomplete! Determinism leaves the road at every corner, as I knew all 
along, and the cause is very likely hidden in this gentleman’s observation.  
Lady Croom Of what? 
Thomasina The action of bodies in heat.        
        (Stoppard. Arcadia, 118) 
Punning on the theory that “the universe is deterministic all right … but the only thing going 
wrong is people fancying people who aren’t supposed to be in that part of the plan” that Chloe 
proposes, Thomasina is in fact anticipating the second law of thermodynamics (104).8 Related to 
bodies having different temperatures, the law implies that the flow of heat is unidirectional, 
therefore directly contradicts Newtonian bidirectionality. Additionally, it comes with the clause 
that some of the heat gets dissipated in the process. Valentine explains it better with an example 
of a ball breaking a window. “You can put back the bits of glass, but you can’t collect up the bits 
of the smash” meaning that try as one might, the heat will eventually “go into the mix” (132). 
Energy will be converted into entropy, leading to the heat death of the universe, stirring 
“disorder out of disorder into disorder until pink is complete, unchanging and unchangeable” just 
like porridge (12).  
                                                 
8 The first law of thermodynamics states that the total energy of an isolated system remains constant, while the 
second law states that the total entropy, or disorder, of an isolated system increases with time implying an 
irreversibility in the flow of energy.  
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“The Improved Newtonian Universe would cease and grow cold” remarks Hannah, as she 
grasps the concept, and dejected as she feels, her unhappiness cannot compare to Septimus’ 
because his fundamental ideology rests of the assurance that everything in the universe if lost, is 
recoverable (132). Stoppard gives us a window into this mentality during a discourse with 
Thomasina. Reflecting on the great library of Alexandria going up in flames almost has her in 
tears and she bitterly wonders “how can we sleep for grief?” (56). To this, Septimus confidently 
asserts that there is no cause for worry, and that they must “count their stock” and celebrate the 
art that did persist, because: 
The procession is very long and life is very short. We die on the 
march. But there is nothing outside the march so nothing can be 
lost to it. The missing plays of Sophocles will turn up piece by 
piece, or be written in another language. Ancient cures for diseases 
will reveal themselves once more. Mathematical discoveries 
glimpsed and lost to view will have their time again.   
               (Stoppard, Arcadia, 57) 
He is correct about the mathematics getting rediscovered, especially with respect to all of 
Thomasina’s theories that surfaced years after her death, although I have trouble believing that 
art can be recovered in its original form, given the simple exercise in (re)translating Shakespeare 
that proved to be unsatisfactory. The point of this excerpt however, is to establish Septimus’ 
endorsement of the view that time is infinite and all the knowledge in the world is recoverable, 
and how his worldview is completely dismantled by the prospect of a universe that succumbs to 
the laws of thermodynamics.  
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A CHAOTIC STRUCTURE 
The genius of Stoppard extends not only to simplify and weave issues of chaos theory into the 
forefront of his audience’s consciousness, but his precision and meticulousness dictates that he 
attempt to incorporate the content into the narrative structure. Fleming dissects the scene-by-
scene composition of the play and points out that the plot progression bifurcates alternately into 
the two time periods, eventually descending into chaos as in the final scene the characters and 
dialogues are “doubled by time” in the same space while music bleeds through the ages (203-
204).  
Perhaps unintentionally, Stoppard also happens to have incorporated a dynamical systems 
approach in the plot construction: the narrative is strewn with stable fixed points that bifurcate 
into instability. This is most evident on an emotional scale, when characters unexpectedly exhibit 
extremely strong reactions in response to a situation. For instance, Mrs. Chater’s infidelity was a 
well-known fact, with Septimus brashly referring to “her readiness that keeps her in a state of 
tropical humidity” (Stoppard, Arcadia, 15). Apart from the easily suppressed altercation with her 
husband, her affairs were of scant consequence until Lady Croom’s emotions got involved and 
the system, as it were, spiraled out of control and got overturned in the course of hours. Bernard 
and Valentine were relatively reasonable until they got blindingly defensive about art and 
science, falsely supporting unstable views that neither believed. The most compelling example is 
Septimus, who is described as “blithe, witty and apparently completely unperturbable” (Edwards 
182). However, one scientific discovery about a possible end to time tipped him over the edge to 
become the Sidley Park hermit that Hannah ended up studying.  
Over hundreds and thousands of years, forms of energy morph into one another and heat 
dissipates to ultimately drop the temperature of the universe to an absolute zero. And yet, over 
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generations, chemicals rearrange themselves to produce more and more complex internal 
structures that seem to contradict the notion of entropy by expanding the conscious capacity of 
beings. Information in the contemporary world increases exponentially and so does knowledge. 
Thomasina and her knowledge were consumed by the flames like the library at Alexandria, but 
in rejection of an absolute end, it resurfaced after years, just like the proof of Fermat’s last 
theorem. 
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HAPGOOD 
 
 
 
There is a straight ladder that leads from the atom to the grain of 
sand, and the only real mystery in physics is the missing rung. 
Below it, particle physics; above it, classical physics; but in 
between, metaphysics.      
                               (Kerner to Hapgood,545) 
The iterated equations in Arcadia produced structures that resembled an infinitely scaled 
synecdoche where each part contained the whole. Hapgood on the other hand uses a different 
type of scaling: it involves an infinite stretching of atomic properties to describe not only 
movement and physicality in humans but to encompass nuances of human behavior. Although 
there are allusions to two sides of the human temperament in Arcadia, it is “by no means in the 
foreground. And yet, it’s firing all around target, making a pattern around the target,” like a 
region of probability of the position of an electron, and it seems fitting that this concept be 
explored in detail in Hapgood (Fleming, Finding Order Amidst Chaos, 195). In his introduction 
to the play, Fleming quotes Stoppard as saying, “I was fascinated by the mystery which lies in 
foundation of the observable world, of which the most familiar is the wave/particle duality of 
light. I thought it was a good metaphor for human personality” (175). Double agents, spies with 
volatile personalities and complicated pasts act as the elements and catalysts in an experiment, 
reacting to situations and mirroring unintuitive scientific concepts to produce a play that is both 
intellectually dense, and riveting. 
SETTING AND STRUCTURE 
Set in the late 1980’s, Hapgood derives its name from the fiercely strong woman who runs the 
British Secret Service and whose operation is being threatened by an internal double agent. The 
opening scene in the original production featured “a red dot [moving] about a map of London 
that is projected onto panels,” tracing the movements of men being followed by the British secret 
service: an accurate estimate of their location but not necessarily their identity, giving “the 
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audience the vicarious pleasure of spy surveillance” (Fleming, 182). The visuo-auditory opening 
transitions into a choreographed exchange of towels and briefcases in the men’s changing room 
of a municipal swimming-baths. The audience is invited to infer the rules of exchange for 
themselves, overwhelmed and bemused for the most part by swinging cubicle doors and 
characters walking on and off stage in swimming trunks. What gets revealed through barked 
commands and spy jargon is that whatever the purpose, the operation was an utter failure. 
Kerner, the scientist working for the British Secret Service as a double agent, was suspected of 
leaking classified information to the Russian government, but the trap that was set up to catch 
him in the act mysteriously backfired on the executors. 
The first scene sets up the audience to expect a spy thriller, one where various suspects 
are interrogated, and a set of clues uncovered in the right order points towards the culprit: in 
short, a whodunit. However, Stoppard seeks to make this play deviate from the genre, and have it 
closely resemble a “scientific paper in which the denouement – the discovery – is announced at 
the beginning” (Fleming, 180). The perpetrator is revealed (to be Ridley) very early in the play, 
and the story becomes more of a howdunit. Naturally, the decision to adopt this approach is an 
example of the Stoppardian trope of designing structural elements that reflect the content of a 
narrative, but it has also been done for reasons of etiquette. 
When I write an experiment I do not wish you to be surprised, it is 
not a joke. This is why a science experiment is a beautiful thing: 
first, here is what we will find; now here is how we find it; here is 
the first puzzle, here is the answer, now we can move on. This is 
polite. We don’t save up all the puzzles to make a triumph for the 
author.      
(Stoppard, Hapgood, 543) 
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Interpreting this quote rather literally, Katherine Kelly argues that more so than a scientific 
paper, Hapgood is set up as a scientific experiment wherein “act 1 leads to a hypothesis, act 2 
carries out the experiment” (Tom Stoppard and the Craft of Comedy, 155). Broken down further, 
the first scene is the failed execution of an experiment, due to the lack of sufficient evidence to 
establish Kerner’s guilt. Were the narrative to be reorganized chronologically, Ridley’s 
involvement in the two busted operations in Paris and Athens would be the analeptic events that 
corroborated the subsequent hypothesis that Ridley was to blame. The design of the second 
experiment occurs off-stage, and in that sense Stoppard isn’t entirely being polite. However, as 
Kelly points out, a completely transparent script “would fail to give the [audience] the pleasure 
of discovery” (Kelly, 154). The execution of the experiment happens on stage, and although well 
thought out, the lack of constancy of human character complicates matters considerably.  
Kerner is portrayed as the idiosyncratic foreigner, with a formidable intellect and a 
mellow disposition acquired through his profession as a scientist. His constant desire to get 
words and meanings right is endearing, and adds to his scattered yet precise personality such as 
him interrupting his own ruminations on Einstein’s religious crisis with “what is a hamster by the 
way? No tell me in a minute.” In some contexts, this trait lends humor to the scene, but in most 
others it serves to reveal his ideology and important plot clues (Stoppard, Hapgood, 545). 
Through most of the action, Kerner’s voice acts as the meta-narrator, describing the plot 
progression and structure, along with exhibiting a keen understanding of people just by drawing 
analogies to science. 
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PLOT MECHANICS 
Immediately after the meet at the pool, Blair corners Kerner at the zoo in an attempt to gauge 
where the latter’s loyalties lie, going over the mechanics of the trap they had laid out for him, 
expressing his vexation at the fact that they couldn’t figure out how the job got botched. It 
transpired that Kerner’s briefcase had been emptied of its contents, and since the bleep stopped 
transmitting a signal and none of the agents gave off a Geiger reading, it seemed as if the job was 
done by “Mr. Nobody” (504). Blair is confused by the events of the morning because he 
concludes that had the person removed only the extra information being leaked, the agency 
would have been “none the wiser” (504). The same question bothers Wates, the suave CIA agent, 
and it is here that Kerner exhibits his logical brilliance when, without missing a beat he responds 
that “obviously because he put in a roll of film and they all look the same; he had to take them 
all” (504).  
The other issue revolves around the identity of the Mr. Nobody, and although Hapgood 
and her agents have reason to suspect Ridley, they cannot figure out how he managed to pull off 
the operation. Hapgood realized that the two Russians sent instead of Georgi “were expendable, 
they were meant to be seen” because their presence served as a distraction from Ridley being 
observed and his cover being blown (508). Wates fell for that very trap, and “nearly cut himself 
shaving, he was so fascinated,” and was going to do a diagram of the movements during the 
exchange (508). Kerner however, immediately recognizes that Wates’ diagram was in essence 
“the bridges of Konigsberg, only simpler” (542).1 This is a classic problem in mathematics 
                                                 
1 See Figure 2 The Seven Bridges of Konigsberg, solved by Leonhard Euler. Kerner says: "Imagine nutcrackers with 
one bridge across the handles and one across the hinge and four bridges on to the island which would be a walnut if 
you were cracking walnuts" (541). 
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which originated with the citizens of Konigsberg2 attempting to navigate the city by crossing 
each of the seven bridges exactly once, and ended with Euler’s generalizations in graph theory 
and positional geometry. He proved that “it can’t be done, you need two walkers,” and in this 
situation Kerner explains, the only way to explain the discrepancy is the involvement of a Ridley 
twin (542).   
Hapgood and her agents decide that the way to trap Ridley is to make him believe that 
they are both prime suspects in the investigation (seeing as Hapgood was his only alibi in all 
three of the failed operations) and that both of them need to face temporary suspension. In a 
“friendly interview” that Blair holds in Hapgood’s office, Blair and Wates try and throw Ridley 
off track by framing Kerner, who “made up the truth” about being converted back into a Russian 
spy from his official position as a British joe (548, 592). During the meeting, they stage a 
revelation about Hapgood’s son being kidnapped, and this time, it is the ‘personal’ that interferes 
with the ‘professional’. Throughout the play, Hapgood is depicted as self-confessedly making 
allowances for her son, speaking of her “intelligence network as the only one in the Western 
hemisphere [exhibiting] seasonal fluctuations, and it is only a matter of time someone works out 
it’s the school holidays” (514). Given that she will do anything for her Joe, she tells Ridley that 
she is willing to exchange the tape containing real secrets, but unfortunately the only way to do 
so is with the help of her (pseudo) twin sister. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Incidentally, Kerner’s character in the play was born in Kaliningrad, which had earlier been Konigsberg. He 
mentions that he just missed being German instead of Russian, and Fleming attributes that too as a feature of 
double-ness in his identity. 
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SCIENCE SEIZES THE SPY WORLD 
Speaking of prime suspects, all through the two scenes in which he is being cross-examined by 
Blair, Kerner lapses into explanations of scientific theories that turn out to be extremely relevant 
analogies. They are also veiled confessions of his guilt, but the intellectual weight of the 
discussion turns out to be an excellent distractor from the matter at hand. He muses about the 
usage of the word ‘prime’ in association with suspects, saying that they “don’t divide nicely … 
It’s the last thing to expect from a suspect. You must look for squares. The product of twin 
roots” (572). Just like the root of a number can be both, positive and negative, people too can be 
seen as having more than one identity. “We’re all doubles … The one who puts on the clothes in 
the morning is the working majority, but at night – perhaps in the moment before 
unconsciousness – we meet our sleeper” (Stoppard, Hapgood, 572-73). This was the concept that 
intrigued Stoppard, the exploration of dualities or the double nature of human personalities. He 
referred to the mechanics of the plot as “just a necessary nuisance to provide an opportunity to 
write about this woman who in Blair’s words is ‘sort of a double,’ and the way this bears upon 
her relationships with Blair, Kerner and Ridley” (Fleming 178). 
Infinitely more exciting than a number having two distinct square roots is the ability of a 
single electron to be in two places at once. Kerner says that it “defeats surveillance because when 
you know what it’s doing you can’t be certain where it is, and when you know where it is you 
can’t be certain what it’s doing” because as an electron jumps from one state to another, losing a 
packet – or quantum – of energy, and at that moment of the quantum jump, it is like two 
electrons (Stoppard, Hapgood, 544-45). This quality makes “the particle world the dream world 
of the intelligence officer,” implying that the best alibi for a double agent is himself, or in the 
real world, a secret identical twin (544). Stoppard manipulates this trait theatrically by having 
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characters transition from one location to another without passing in between, such as Blair 
switching from the pool to the zoo, or by having a character transition into another, such as in the 
‘inter-scene,’ where Ridley remains on stage, except “he is carrying a suitcase [and] is a different 
Ridley,” i.e. his twin (570). Along with the physical analogues however, Stoppard recognizes 
that the spectrum of human emotions in relationship to quantum particles is an interesting one to 
explore as well.  
TWINNING 
Celia Newton invades the stage like a slap in the face. Frumpy, irresponsible, cluttered, and with 
a house reeking of marijuana, Celia makes no effort to hide her expletives in ‘sugar’ and ‘ff-
fiddles.’ She is caustically critical of Betty (Hapgood ), and does an incredibly convincing 
act of a jealous sister. Ridley is completely nonplussed, saying “she may be your twin, but there 
the resemblance ends. She’s a pothead, it reeks … she won’t stop talking, she picks her nose, she 
looks like shit,” and compared to the woman who plays chess through memory alone, and is 
thoughtful enough to buy a single lemon for Wates’ tea, the disparity is alarming, but crucial in 
emphasizing Hapgood’s double nature (566). Blair says that he always suspected her of being “a 
little anarchist,” but the scene involving Celia reveals that the problem has always been about 
reconciling the ‘personal’ with the ‘technical’ (561). Demastes suggests that it is a sort of 
schizophrenia, proposing that being Celia allows Hapgood to analyze the suppressed aspect of 
her personality.  
In subscribing fully to the act of playing her antithesis, Hapgood embraces that 
personality, and combined with the personal-technical conundrum, she not only sleeps with 
Ridley, but also warns him of a possible trap because “his desire to save her son makes him 
worthy of being allowed to escape” (Fleming, 186). In a nasty outburst at the shooting range, he 
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accuses Elizabeth of wanting to sleep with him if only she could “pull her bodice up past her 
brain,” and Celia is exactly that, an Elizabeth “without the brains or the taste” and hence a 
fulfillment of his fantasy (Stoppard, Hapgood, 540, 585). 
Unlike Celia Newton, Ridley’s twin gets barely any stage space. He is a silent presence, 
visible only during the two meets and the brief inter-scene. Although we know that he is the 
other half of the famous KGB twins, his mentality and personality are completely obscured, and 
being given the opportunity to examine them would be interesting, especially because Ridley 
himself is complicated. He has an adventurous streak, and his moral compass is of dubious 
nature given that he is a double agent, and that he has no qualms about committing murder; 
nonetheless he goes out on a limb to help get Hapgood’s son back. “He is ultimately two discrete 
Ridleys occupying one body, muddling his affairs by remaining in the realm of either/or” and 
exhibits schizophrenic behavior similar to Hapgood herself (Demastes, 82). In the light of this 
perspective, it would be interesting to explore newer discoveries in quantum mechanics and their 
relation to twinning. Quantum entanglement is described as a pair of particles with opposite 
quantum properties separated in space, wherein the manipulation of one particle causes changes 
in behavior in the other, and drawing analogues to separate halves of human personality would 
be a splendid thought experiment. 
Not just on the level of twins, the question of doubles is a pervasive one in the play, and 
Fleming points out how the “structure engages the theme of duality, as nearly every one of the 
twelve scenes has a double” (181). He explicates how there are two scenes at the pool, two zoo 
scenes with Kerner and Blair, two rugby scenes showing Hapgood’s “relationship not only with 
her son but also with the two men whom she loves,” two office scenes, and two involving Ridley 
and Celia (181). The scene at the shooting range is the only outlier, and Fleming explains away 
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the potentially problematic office scene involving Ridley and Celia by interpreting it in the light 
of her exhibiting her dual personality within it. Hapgood transitions from the crude Celia 
snapping “don’t fancy your fuckin’ chances,” to calmly saying “yes Maggs – everything’s fine. 
Queen to king one” in a matter of minutes (580,582).  
Stoppard based his play on “three central conceits,” the first of which was to have a 
“physicist who loses faith in certainty because of uncertainty” (Fleming, 178). However, it seems 
to me that Kerner’s ability to see double-ness in everything makes him the most successful 
character. Demastes too talks about Hapgood’s conversion to Kerner’s way of thinking, and 
Blair and Ridley’s rigid inability to do so. Near the end Hapgood realizes the inanity of the 
espionage circle when she exclaims “What network?!” and in reference to the opposition, 
correctly reasons “we’re just keeping each other in business, we should send each other 
Christmas cards – oh f-f-fuck it, Paul” (Stoppard, Hapgood, 591). Because of her 
professionalism and either/or outlook in the past, she preferred to raise young Joe as a single 
mother over letting Kerner’s identity be dismantled, a fact that she presumably regretted and 
Kerner most definitely resented. “Cohesion of being is not singularly linear but multiple and 
simultaneous,” Demastes observes, and advocates for a non-binary outlook on life (83). 
MORALITY AND RATIONALITY: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 
Stoppard chooses the unconventional choice of a zoo as a background for a Blair and Kerner to 
have a chat, twice. The first scene is a discussion of the failure and perplexities surrounding the 
meet at the swimming pool; the second is the staged interrogation that took place in Hapgood’s 
office. Both times, Kerner’s character and loyalties are under scrutiny, and both times he 
confesses to being guilty without feeling any guilt about his actions. Much like the invisible bars 
of the cage that cast a shadow on his face, Kerner is trapped in a quandary. “A double agent is 
31 
 
like a trick of the light,” he says, explaining the double slit experiment in physics involving a 
beam of light being shone into a box wherein one can demonstrate that light behaves both as a 
wave, and as particle (Stoppard, Hapgood, 500). Because Kerner believes that he is inherently 
double, he says he “frankly [doesn’t] remember which side [he’s] supposed to be on,” and that he 
doesn’t even necessarily have to, so comfortable is he with the uncertainty (501). Blair (irritably) 
understands the concept, but cannot seem to translate it to reality. He wants to know whose side 
Kerner is on, the “what’s what” of things, a trait that he doggedly adheres to until the end of the 
narrative, and which unfortunately leads to his downfall (500).  
Kerner also refers to the observer effect, an extremely non-intuitive concept in particle 
physics wherein the act of observing a phenomenon alters the state of the particles being 
observed. With respect to the narrative being an analogy for a research project, this concept is 
put into use in both the experiments that were performed. The team had designed the morning’s 
exchange with the purpose of determining Kerner’s allegiances. In mathematical terms, their null 
hypothesis was Kerner’s innocence, with a Geiger reading and the transmission of a ‘bleep’ 
being evidence of his guilt. Translated to the duality of light, they were attempting to see if 
Kerner’s trajectory was straight like a bullet, or bent like a wave, and all of the evidence pointed 
not to his being a bullet, but to Ridley’s being a wave. The irony and brilliance of the setup of the 
plot is that on the flip side, during the process of deceiving Ridley into believing that he wasn’t a 
suspect, Kerner confessed to leaking his research and himself being bent. The two double agents 
acted exactly like a trick of the light, and exposed their nature only when the scientists/ secret 
service agents weren’t explicitly trying to observe their actions. 
It is during the second conversation at the zoo that Kerner reveals that his original motive 
for coming to Britain was the simple matter of technological superiority, but also says that “there 
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is something terrible about love.3 It uses up all of one’s moral judgement,” and in conjunction 
with his earlier assertion that the secrets were his to give up, it is a clear indication that he had 
been converted back to a spy (Stoppard, Hapgood, 573). Even so, Blair chooses to trust him, 
because he recognizes that Kerner’s loyalties lie with Hapgood. Whether it is her technical side 
or her personal is a matter that he doesn’t consider, because to him loyalties too are zero or one. 
“Oh, Paul. You would betray her before I would” Kerner bursts out, an assertion which turns out 
to be entirely true (574).  
The play features several moments of unwavering loyalty, firstly when Blair refuses to let 
Wates coerce him into subscribing to the notion that Hapgood and Ridley were perhaps working 
together, and secondly when Hapgood passionately cries out “Kerner is my joe!” so convinced is 
she of his allegiances (538). However, Blair endangers the life of Hapgood’s son by physically 
bringing him to the second pool meet when he had promised her that he would be kept out of it. 
When Hapgood says that she couldn’t ever forgive him for it, Blair calmly responds “I know 
that. I knew that” (590). Kerner being Blair’s counterpoint in this matter, gave up his program 
for the anti-particle trap because they threatened to kidnap Joe. His affection for his son is 
evident from very early in the play where he is revealed to have sent him candy, and had a 
picture of him tucked inside his wallet, and regardless of the anger and sense of betrayal he feels 
towards Hapgood, he was loyal to her on a personal level.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Hilary from The Hard Problem would probably think of Kerner as an interesting case study. 
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TYING UP LOOSE ENDS 
Although Stoppard mainly employed Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle of electrons to explain 
the necessity for the KGB twins and to visually represent quantum jumps, he extended the 
analogy to encompass actions undertaken by the characters as well. Blair and Kerner’s decisions 
to value the professional over the personal, and vice versa, serve to reinforce the uncertainty and 
unpredictability of human behavior in a situation. In his essay, Paul Edwards “is compelled to 
ask why [Hapgood] and her colleagues are certain that in a play illustrating the Uncertainty 
Principle – that Ridley will indeed summon his twin and pass a dummy disk, keeping what he 
thinks is a genuine disk for himself” (175). The answer lies primarily in the feelings Ridley 
houses toward Hapgood, and secondarily in his allegiances to the Russian secret service. Ridley 
says that the meet “smells like a dead cat” and suspects that the kidnapping was an inside job that 
Blair or Kerner had rigged; “it never smelt Russian, not for a minute,” he says after being 
captured, indicating that he wanted to intercept the delivery and pass the genuine disk onto the 
Russians and finish the original job that initiated the narrative (Stoppard, Hapgood, 585, 587). 
Edwards also questions the need for a second Ridley at the exchange, but that issue is tied to the 
previous point about being present to intercept the disk, and the Konigsberg problem of requiring 
a second person.  
Since Kerner’s career as a double agent is over, he decides to move back to Russia. This, 
Hapgood correctly guesses is toska po rodine, or “homesickness, but squared,” and she is 
extremely affected by his decision (Stoppard, Hapgood, 538). As he begins walking away, 
however, the game starts and “Kerner’s interest is snagged” (593). Hapgood glancing back 
notices that he hasn’t moved and the stage directions report that she “comes alive” (593). The 
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audience doesn’t know if he decided to stay or leave, and the play is suspended on the very 
uncertainty that drives its progression. 
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THE HARD 
PROBLEM 
 
 
“We’ve accounted for every particle in the universe except for   
dark matter, and we’re working on that. And here you are on 
your knees to what? To who?” 
                                                                       (Spike to Hilary,10)
              
After delving into the core of quantum mechanics and chaos theory from a humanitarian 
perspective and alluding to the relationship humans share with the natural and mathematical 
world in some of his other works, Stoppard hurls headlong into exploring questions that seem 
ordinary on the surface but have implications in understanding the human being as a conscious, 
decision making entity. For the first time, Stoppard abandons the use of analogy to explain 
breakthroughs in science, and indulges in a recapitulation of scientific debates that have taken 
place over the past half a century. Was there really enough time in the history of the world to 
allow for random chemical reactions to eventually lead to the bio-diversity we witness? Or was 
the process unwittingly helped along by creatures vying for food, who only got better through 
generations and eliminated the underdogs? Or is there an entirely different explanation, perhaps 
working in conjunction with the others, wherein there exists an inherent selfishness within the 
spirals of DNA that ensured that only the best would survive, while the rest perished? Moving 
outward from the cellular makeup, is there a continual behavioral evolution amongst humans that 
distinguishes us from other species, and, if so what was the point of bifurcation that made us 
different on the level of consciousness? The Hard Problem uses the lack of consensus in the 
scientific world as the base upon which characters explore the biological human. Given the shift 
in societal structure and priorities over time, Stoppard recognizes that there is no better setting 
for his new play than in a research lab rife with politics, and the main contributor to progress is 
the hunger to remain afloat and perhaps gain some recognition in a vastly competitive world.  
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Stoppard characteristically offsets an intellectual discussion with slapstick humor and 
elegant quips, but uncharacteristically, he also adds an element of explicit emotion to the mix by 
having his protagonist allow herself to articulate her feelings. It can be suspected that the 
vulnerability he introduces is a rhetoric of pathos as well as an embodiment of the message the 
play is trying to deliver. Since the preoccupations of this play don’t exactly possess a physical 
component that the structure can embody, Stoppard’s meticulousness manifests itself by having 
his characters engage personally, and not just professionally with the issues they are examining. 
To some degree, this mirroring quality validates their findings but sometimes it subverts them, 
indicating that the reason some questions remain unanswered could have to do with the sheer 
difficulty in summarizing a human being by a fixed set of rules.  
IN A NUTSHELL 
Nicholas Hytner, director of The Hard Problem at the National Theater opens his discussion by 
reading out the letter Stoppard wrote to him when he conceived of the play: 
“I want to write a character who is good, not goody-goody, 
and believes that goodness has an objective reality which is not 
captured by, explained by, defined by evolutionary science, evo-
biology, evo-psychology, neo-Darwinism … the setting is based on 
someplace like the Allen Institute in Seattle, but we are in England. 
Paul Allen, ex-Microsoft has financed a Brain Science lab to 
investigate how brains work etc. The play’s dates are to 
accommodate my hazy notion that my Allen is a hedge fund guy 
and the credit crunch is where we’re headed. So, a play about 
evolutionary biology and the banking crisis” 
Stoppard says that, to him “the concept of morality is unintelligible without 
consciousness,” and Hilary the protagonist is an embodiment of Stoppard’s philosophy. A 
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behavioral psychologist working at the Krohl, she is convinced of the inherent goodness in 
people, and is hence trying to detect the presence of altruism in humans all the while trying to 
decipher the origin of consciousness in humans (Stoppard, The Hard Problem, 13).  The course 
of the play reveals that her primary reason behind studying the phenomenon of altruism could 
perhaps be driven by self-interest, which further serves to contribute to the overall problem of 
humans attempting to study themselves, and failing. Apart from her, much of the plot 
progression can be owed indirectly to the existence of Jerry Krohl (Stoppard’s Allen), a 
“squillionaire with a Master’s in biophysics who decided to try hedge funding” (13). He 
established the Krohl Institute for Brain Science, and for that he can technically be described as a 
philanthropist, but the fact that his money was acquired by manipulating people and the stock 
market “raises the interesting question: is Krohl an altruist or an egoist?” (13) 
Regardless of the answer to that question, Stoppard admits to being very interested in the 
fact that Jerry Krohl is a financial trader, and given that the market displays trends of “irrational 
exuberance” even when “it has been established computationally that nothing can possibly go 
wrong” fascinated him (Stoppard, Interview with Hytner). He wanted to write a play about this 
subject in parallel to human unreasonableness because he saw how the two impinged upon each 
other, and that was by considering both systems to be purely computational. To examine the 
behavioral aspect of the notion of financial trading, Stoppard introduces Krohl Capital 
Management (KCM), home of quantitative financial engineers (or quants) who use equations to 
describe stock market trends and predict future behavior. As Amal succinctly points out, “the 
market is a belief system with a short memory, and it’s leveraged on highly correlated billion 
dollar bets -and trillions on side bets,” and the key word here is belief (Stoppard, The Hard 
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Problem, 33-34). Solely that, and not rationality, is what makes hedge funding a profitable 
endeavor.  
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, OR INTELLIGENT DESIGN? 
The failure to explicate human behavior is the driving force of the play, with Spike the entirely 
rational, mathematically adept scientist acting as the primary antagonist to Hilary’s optimism and 
faith in the human condition. Because we see Hilary saying her prayers and bursting into tears 
early in the play, it is very easy for a scientifically minded member of the audience to find 
himself identifying with Spike’s rationale.  As the play proceeds, however, it becomes 
increasingly evident that perhaps the scientific method, although rigorous, is reductionist in its 
approach, and Hilary’s arguments begin to gain traction in comparison to those proposed by the 
other characters who aggressively hold onto their logic.  
Years of ruminating on the unpredictable probability of the scientific world and its 
increasingly faithful followers has Stoppard wondering if obstinate empiricism is any different 
from organized religion, and whether we have closed our minds to the prospect of unknowability 
solely because the lack of pursuit would take away our purpose as a species. The hard problem 
therefore gets formulated at the point where the validity of hard evidence-based science comes 
into question, and for an audience member following the arguments to a reasonable extent, this is 
the moment when The Hard Problem acquires a foothold in their mind.   
Proponents of the possibility of programming Artificial Intelligence – which in the 
present world is a significant portion of the population1 – believe that the human brain is a 
                                                 
1 In a TED talk titled “Can we build AI without losing control over it”, Sam Harris talks not only about the 
possibility of developing AI, but builds on the premise that it is comfortably within the grasp of humans in terms of 
technological development, and the only factor of uncertainty is time. 
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machine with parts that all fit into each other, and the only task remaining is to figure out the 
connections. The other school of thought, the one that Hilary belongs to is convinced that there is 
an additional component that makes the human a conscious, sentient being capable of 
formulating and understanding metaphors. Whether that component is God, or something 
empirically defined is Hilary’s constant battle with the rest of the scientific world. During a 
conference in Venice, Hilary in a heated outburst directed at Spike’s stubborn refusal to consider 
her viewpoint says: 
Everything is matter. There is no science that says beauty is truth 
or truth beauty, but the gondolas are heaving with name tagged 
materialists having their mind blown at Venice. What is to be done 
about the sublime if you’re proud to be a materialist? To save the 
appearance of value, no theory is too unlikely, no idea too far-out 
to float as long as it sounds like science – elementary particles with 
teeny-weeny consciousness; or a cosmos with attitude; or the life 
of a mind as the software of a biological computer. These are 
desperate measures, Spike! What does materialism remind you of? 
It’s a faith.              
    (Stoppard, The Hard Problem, 48)  
One finds it easy to sympathize with Spike because the alternative seems too horrifying: 
discarding Hilary’s opinion as garbled nonsense is easier for someone who attributes the death of  
a sick relative to the failure of medicine as opposed to the fanciful wielding of God’s hand. 
Rationally speaking however, Hilary’s argument doesn’t solve all the mysteries in the world, it 
only attempts to prove that perhaps one mystery is unsolvable, indicating that scientists can 
abandon this one question and dedicate their resources to other pressing matters.  
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Hilary accepts that the question of consciousness is a valid one. That, and her ability to 
think outside the box is what distinguishes her not just from Spike, but Amal as well, and helps 
her land the job at Krohl despite him being significantly better qualified. Similar to Spike, Amal 
is convinced that the brain is physical, nothing more than a computing machine, and “to think 
otherwise would be to regress back to Plato” (24). His method of looking at the historical 
behavior of a system, learning from existing patterns, and using them to solve problems is 
endorsed by most developers of machine learning algorithms. He believes that “a chaotic system 
isn’t really random, it just looks random”, and that it is only a matter of time before the 
neurobiology reveals its inner dynamics (25). Because Hilary exhibits leanings towards cognitive 
psychology, she cannot stomach a simplistic sensory input  motor output philosophy. During 
her and Amal’s interview at the Krohl, her boss Leo, the two men are discussing whether 
computers are ‘thinking’ while playing chess, and she jumps in, arguing that: 
Hilary It’s not deep. If that’s thinking. An adding machine on speed. A two-way switch 
with a memory. Why wouldn’t it play chess? But when it’s [my turn] to move, is the 
computer thoughtful or is it sitting there like a toaster? It’s sitting there like a toaster. 
Leo So what would be your idea of deep? 
Hilary A computer that minds losing .    
(Stoppard, The Hard Problem, 23) 
Hilary’s main contention with AI is that they aren’t programmed to feel emotion the same way 
humans do: to react irrationally and go off the deep end when experiencing distress. Which is 
why she challenges Spike to differentiate between sorrow and pain when it comes to the 
conscious processing of a stimulus.  
41 
 
MORALITY: INNATE OR ACQUIRED? 
The play opens with the question of rationality in the face of a threat to one’s self, taking form in 
an argument regarding the Prisoner’s dilemma.2 A fairly standard example in “the Ladybird book 
of game theory” as Hilary puts it, the Prisoner’s dilemma is a game concerning the rewards 
associated with either betraying or cooperating with a partner in crime (4). Rationally speaking, 
remaining silent would be in the best interest of both participants because that would result in a 
minimum sentence for each. However, purely self-interested people tend to betray each other and 
end up with a higher sentence. Spike hotly advocates for an algorithmic zero-sum game theory 
type of approach, and Hilary insists that love for the accomplice can offset that approach and 
dismantle the entire foundation of this thought experiment.  
Spike is appalled by her mentality and instantly transitions into explaining the theory that 
behavior and morality are simply a product of evolutionary biology. “You’re not an ant or a 
bee,” he says, referring to the group altruistic behavior exhibited by these species, and continues 
to berate her by providing examples of seemingly good behavior in the animal kingdom that 
originally stemmed from self-interest, not selflessness (5). Stoppard admits that Spike’s “got a 
better argument, because he’s on solid ground, literally … her argument is in a sense a negative 
corollary, it derives from a very subjective sense of what is adequate to the agony and ecstasy of 
human life” (Stoppard, Interview with Hytner). Hilary being anthropocentric in her ideology 
cannot seem to translate morality and motives developed in animals to those in humans, but 
Spike helps her, saying:  
                                                 
2 Formalized by Alan Tucker in 1950, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game involving two prisoners A and B 
questioned separately, and offered the following deal by their prosecutors: 
1. If A and B each betrays the other, each serves two years in prison 
2. If A betrays B, and B remains silent, A is released and B serves three years 
3. If A and B both remain silent, both of them serve one year in prison. 
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Spike  I don’t see that we have much to feel superior about, as a species. Altruism is 
always self-interest, it just needs a little working out. 
Hilary  Like you going miles out of your way to give me a lift home? 
Spike  Exactly. It’s a cost-benefit thing. I go miles out of my way because you might 
invite me in for coffee, and I throw in a tutorial to get into your –  
Hilary  Pants.      (Stoppard, The Hard Problem, 6) 
Their discussion is further complicated by the introduction of the idea that genes themselves are 
self-serving and hence even mother love (which Hilary considers to be a virtue) is based in utility 
and maximizing survival of the genetic makeup. Focusing specifically on selfish versus selfless 
motives, her model of the “Nature-Nurture Convergence in Egoistic and Altruistic Parent-
Offspring Behavior” seeks to demonstrate that Darwinian evolution cannot be the sole source of 
behavioral patterns (9).   
It is here that Hilary questions if evolutionary biologists “left out” the element that makes 
us conscious because, and she has a point that resonates with Stoppard’s own when she says 
“human DNA is seventy percent banana”, and “bananas aren’t thinking” (11-12). Speaking of 
the complexity of the human brain, she muses, “if organizing components the right way is all it 
takes, then a thermostat is a kiddie step towards being conscious3” and concludes that the idea of 
God cannot be that much of a stretch of the imagination (12). For a sufficiently skeptical member 
of the audience, this is a good time to scoff at Hilary’s unconvincing logic, but she later clarifies 
that her faith is less in “someone who created the world in six days and then had a rest,” but in an 
entity that can perhaps explain the disjunction between a grunting chimp ancestor and a human 
                                                 
3 This strongly resonates with Thomasina’s musings in Arcadia about what is wrong with the prevailing design of 
the universe, especially where she calls classical geometry the “shapes of manufacture” (Stoppard, 55). 
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using words like “hypothesis” (50,10). Advocating yet again for the argument for evo-bio and 
the arrangement of neurons, Spike says: 
Spike But it’s pathetic to rely on a supreme being to underwrite what you call your 
values. Why are you afraid of making your own? 
Hilary You don’t claim to make your own. What’s the difference between a supreme 
being and a being programmed by your biology? 
Spike Freedom. I can override the programming. 
Hilary Who can? Who’s the ‘you’ outside your brain? Where?     
       (Stoppard, The Hard Problem, 48) 
Here Spike slips into murky waters because Hilary is approaching the question of free will that 
was also briefly touched upon in Arcadia. The conversation between Hilary and Spike is 
essentially the difference between a vehement atheist and an agnostic, and it leaves an 
unmistakable trace of a Richard Dawkins4 convention wherein a dismissive attitude towards 
competing theories seems rather reductionist and less compelling than a healthy openness to 
possibility.  
The debate of morality and consciousness as being products of evolution or something 
else is one that has plagued scientists for decades now. Stoppard cites the scientists Thomas 
                                                 
4 The first chapter of Richard Dawkins’ book The God Delusion tries to differentiate Einstein or Hawking’s 
pantheism from belief in the supernatural by terming it “sexed up atheism” and argues that God almost certainly 
does not exist. However, in the interview Stoppard mentions that in a later book Religion without God, Dawkins 
provides a gem of a quote that is extremely relevant to this play. He argues that “it is our living, evolved conception 
of virtue which has defined our deities, and therefore, by ineluctable logic, our values must have preceded the idea 
of God” (Stoppard, Interview with Hytner). 
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Nagel5 and John Searle6 in his acknowledgements for this play, and Hilary is emblematic of their 
philosophies, questioning “how do we get from the physics to the semantics? From the noise to 
meaning” (Searle, Interview 2014). She even experiences slander and criticism similar to Nagel 
with her publication “Is God the Last Man Standing” wherein she uses equations that show the 
disparity between the amount of time required for evolution by chance mutations and geological 
time, thereby implying that “every theory of consciousness has the same degree of 
demonstrability as divine intervention” (54). Although Stoppard doesn’t explicitly launch into a 
detailed exploration of these various theories, he does have Hilary consult Ursula, another 
employee at Krohl about the legitimacy of the prevalent theories. It is worthwhile to delve into a 
few of them because it serves to emphasize her rigor as a scientist even though she seems 
somewhat of a creationist at times.  
ORIGINS OF THE CONSCIOUS MIND 
Hilary raises the issue of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem,7 which states that within any 
consistent algebraic system, there exist statements that neither be proven nor be disproven. 
Douglas Hofstadter wrote a seven-hundred-page book to explicate the complexity of this 
theorem, and relate it to human existence in general, and presumably for reasons of minimalism 
Stoppard left out a discussion on whether the brain as a consistent or inconsistent system. Were it 
possible to prove that the brain swayed a certain way, it would be easy to conclude whether it is a 
computing machine that Amal has resolutely believed it to be, or if it requires something extra. 
                                                 
5 Thomas Nagel is an American philosopher who, in Mind and Cosmos argues that materialism cannot possibly 
account for consciousness and the mind-body problem. He was hailed by Creationists and his book was cause for 
immense debate when it got published. 
6 Stoppard mentions John Searle in his interview with Hytner, saying that “[Searle] found that the adherence of the 
computational mind was more fervent than the people positing something from religious doctrines,” which is a 
continuous thread in this play.  
7 In Gödel Escher Bach, the theorem is explained with a helpful analogy: “for each record player, there is a record it 
cannot play” (Contractostipunctus, Hofstadter). 
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The ambiguity of this issue is crucial for the possibility that Hilary raises, namely the one of 
quantum consciousness. Roger Penrose along with Stuart Hameroff8 thinks that developments in 
neurobiology indicate that while administering anesthesia, quantum mechanical forces are at play 
and that they induce chemicals to alter their structure. If that is the case, free will obviously is 
biochemically impossible, but quantum processes could be the hidden element that makes one 
human different from another, and the theory also successfully discards a deterministic and 
fatalistic outlook of explaining the mind. 
Because she pitches the idea of God, Hilary loses credibility among the scientific 
community to some degree and causes her boss Leo to reprimand her, but it almost validates her 
point about materialism seeming dangerously like a faith. “The reason it’s hard, you pig’s arse, 
is that mind-body is the problem,” Leo yells, and it seems to resonate with Spike’s assertion that 
he would “get antsy if there [weren’t] a new journal to look at every day” (55, 50). In short, the 
scientists are so accustomed to keep looking for answers to problems that a simple, 
straightforward explanation like God would make them feel helpless and unable to contribute to 
society, and take away from the reverence that the empiricism of their profession is treated with. 
It is fascinating to note how closely this issue relates to the one about altruism that Hilary is 
jointly exploring. The attitudes expressed by Leo and Spike are the embodiment of the selfish 
motives of successful members of the human species to further their kind to ensure their own 
survival and that of the scientific community.  
                                                 
8 Together, Penrose and Hameroff produced the Orch-OR (Orchestrated Objective Reduction) theory which makes a 
case for quantum consciousness. Stoppard also corroborates this theory in his interview. 
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ALTRUISM: IN THE LAB AND AT THE TRADING DESK 
The other angle that Stoppard chooses to employ to further explore the issue of altruism is the 
one that serves to tie the pieces of the play together. In that sense, the closest he gets to 
developing a theatrical analogue to reflect a scientific problem is the financial market which 
consists entirely of egoistical transactions carried out by people motivated by self-interest. By 
introducing a setting such as this, Stoppard puts pressure on both sides of the anthropocentric 
argument. Hilary is rooting for the uniqueness of consciousness in humans to argue for the 
existence of a moral compass, whereas Spike is purely Darwinian and doesn’t concede to a 
fundamental difference between species. However, the ecosystem of traders is akin to a pack of 
wolves with several alphas who somehow coexist peaceably: an unrealistic situation which 
undermines Spike’s ideology. At the same time, like Amal says, to imagine traders as altruists is 
out of the question because they resemble “African polar bears” in their intransigence to forego 
their own fitness (65). So, within the ecosystem of the financial market, people exhibit group 
behavior while being fiercely self-serving, which is exactly what Hilary is trying to study in her 
egoism-altruism paradigm. 
Along with the genetic aspects of behavior, Hilary suspects social and environmental 
factors that contribute to decision making; Spike on the other hand is convinced that human 
reactions to situations are purely biochemical. He publishes a paper on how hormonal responses 
can be accurate predictors of market behavior. In general, people were thought to roughly be 
categorized as having risk seeking or risk averse personalities. However, his study shows that 
regardless of that affiliation, in ‘bull’ market conditions, traders have high levels of testosterone 
and make high risk, aggressive gambles, whereas in ‘bear’ market conditions people regularly 
express high levels of the stress hormone cortisol, which makes them more conservative in their 
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transactions. This is a very “sexy” result, and it gets Spike hired by Krohl, because the findings 
imply a “monetization of the hormonal state of the trading desk” (56-57). However, a step 
towards a physiological basis of AI is a step away from a psychological one, and given the 
present conditions, Spike’s success happens to be at the expense of the future of Hilary’s 
department.  
While we witness Spike going behind Hilary’s back to improve his status and perhaps 
adversely affect hers, we also see Bo stepping down from her job as a quant at KCM to work 
under Hilary because the money wasn’t good. Bo’s conscience couldn’t handle the idea that her 
job involved “gaming the market to make more money for people with money” and so she quit, 
endangering her evolutionary fitness by settling for a smaller paycheck (42). Bo’s desire to “do 
good with math” seems to make her an ideal candidate for studying altruism (42). Similar to 
Milgram’s famous Stanford prison experiment which used increasingly intense electric shocks 
on an actor to test a subject’s submission to authority, Batson9 designed an experiment where the 
subjects were asked if they wanted to switch spots with the individual undergoing supposed 
torture as a measure of true altruism. He suspected that empathy played a role in the extent to 
which volunteers would give up their own comfort for somebody else. Like the original 
experiment (not mentioned in the play) Hilary was simulating this phenomenon by introducing a 
random suggestibility for empathy. Instead, Bo shrewdly pointed out that using their personal 
                                                 
9 Batson’s experiment was a variation of the Milgram study. It was designed not to study people’s adherence to 
authority, but their willingness to help a person being tortured. The ‘subject’ Elaine (who is actually an actor), is 
reacting to increasingly high intensities of an electric shock. Based on a completely irrelevant questionnaire, the 
subjects of the psychological experiment are randomly assigned to being high or low on the scale of empathy, and 
are informed of their status. They are then shown the footage of Elaine being tortured and asked if they’re willing to 
trade spots. The purpose of the experiment is to test for altruism (reduced personal fitness) with a suggestibility for 
empathy. There are further variations where the test subjects are offered an easy or difficult escape from the 
situation, and that is also a variable that Batson examined. 
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information to induce empathy would be better measure than an impersonal suggestion to the 
subjects that they tested high on empathy.  
Although Hilary does adopt Bo’s suggestion of using the subjects’ personal information, 
she informs Bo of the perils of compensating for outliers that can potentially skew the results of 
a hypothesis, warning her “that’s a sin” (40). This is a chilling foreshadowing of a few scenes 
later where it turns out that Bo did intentionally exclude outliers from her findings. It is 
important to note the continual emphasis that Stoppard places on the scientific method and the 
possible repercussions that accompany the wrongful drawing of conclusions or tampering of 
data. Just like Bernard (in Arcadia) who ignores glaring contradictions to his Byron theory, Bo 
willfully excludes data that doesn’t fit with her desired conclusion10. Right around the time of 
Hilary and Bo’s discussion about ethics, Jerry’s daughter Cathy walks in on Elaine (the test 
subject) being filmed shrieking with increasing distress in response to shocks as part of the 
experiment. Without being provided any context, Cathy expresses concern at the sight she 
beholds. Although she doesn’t offer to take her place instead, it is interesting to note that she 
tests high on empathy11.  
Jerry Krohl’s influencing almost an entire school to participate in the experiment ensures 
a well distributed, large sample size, and some promising results lead to a paper jointly published 
by Hilary and Bo titled “Ultimate Goods,” which demonstrates that people are born altruists by 
nature, but societal influence makes them progressively egotistical. This is in direct opposition to 
the selfish gene hypothesis “that we start of nasty and learn to be nice” (63). In the conversation 
                                                 
10 This practice of choosing to divulge only favorable results is commonly known as “cherry-picking” in the 
scientific community 
11 Especially so because Cathy is the Catherine that Hilary gave up for adoption, and her being highly altruistic in a 
household run by a hedge fund trader provides some bearing to Hilary’s research on parent-offspring behavioral 
tendencies. 
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related to the experiment, Bo questions why the motive for good behavior matters, to which 
Hilary responds that “it might matter if people who are out for themselves think they’re justified 
by biology”, echoing Stoppard who doesn’t like the idea of “marking your own homework” 
(Stoppard, The Hard Problem, 39; Interviews with Hytner). This is an extremely destabilizing 
perspective for someone like Spike (or even Amal) who does really think that selfishness is 
inherent, and his lack of stability is reflected in his inebriated state at the mini celebration at 
Hilary’s place. 
Spike’s sneering comment about the neat linear relationship giving off “a distinct whiff 
of week-old fish” does end up being true (64). The reason behind Bo tampering the evidence 
however, is more interesting than the act itself. Her fault is that she is in love with Hilary and 
wants to please her, which makes her motives selfish. Of course, it raises questions about the 
legitimacy of Bo’s earlier work, the mathematics upon which Hilary based her whole argument 
about divine intervention and is the foundation for changing her career path, but that is an issue 
Stoppard doesn’t address.  
Coming back to the question of motivated behavior, following Bo’s unscrupulousness, 
Hilary makes an addendum to the publication, resigns her position at the Krohl, and goes on to 
study philosophy. Her reasons for doing so are to ensure Bo’s evolutionary survival and fitness, 
seeing as she is a beginner and “the best mathematician in the house” which is beneficial to the 
Krohl, making Hilary’s motives altruistic in nature (70). Hilary essentially enacts her version of 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which serves as her first concrete triumph over Spike. However, as 
Jerry points out, her leaving the Krohl by “doing [her] best to bring Leo’s department around his 
ears sounds more like egoism” (73). 
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Unlike the concepts that the characters explore, the narrative itself seems to fall too 
neatly into place: Julia Chamberlain,12 a classmate from Hilary’s high school, happens to be 
teaching pilates at Krohl. Amal doesn’t get the job he interviewed for but became a quant at 
Krohl Capital where he dated Bo and referred her to the Brain Sciences Institute, and she 
happened to work in Hilary’s department. Spike too met Jerry on a boat and landed a job at 
Krohl. The biggest kicker undoubtedly is Hilary’s daughter being adopted by the Jerry Krohl 
himself. Stoppard resolves this by having Jerry explain to Cathy that a coincidence is “if two 
things which you don’t normally expect to happen at the same time, happen at the same time…” 
and quickly amends the definition to say that there’s reasons why the events happen, “you just 
didn’t have the information” (27). Coincidences abound in this play, and some of them have 
probabilities low enough to qualify as miracles, and yet Stoppard warns against leaping to that 
conclusion as Hilary is prone to do.  
Amal lapses into a diatribe on his position at KCM, saying that “the models [for 
predictive risk] can be proved mathematically to crash about once in the lifetime of the universe. 
But every now and then, the market’s behavior becomes irrational, as though it’s gone mad, or 
fallen in love. It doesn’t compute. It’s only computers compute,” and this type of behavior is 
caused due thousands of humans simultaneously behaving irrationally to make an unlikely event 
happen, we just don’t have all the information (68). I think Stoppard is ultimately trying to say 
that he cannot back up Amal about humans easily being able to program their own minds, but he 
also doesn’t entirely believe Hilary’s explanation about God, because there is an infinitude of 
information that we don’t yet possess. He doesn’t think he can possibly have a definite answer, 
                                                 
12 Stoppard reveals a fun fact about his plays: each of them contains his secretary Chamberlain’s name, saying that 
he put it in there to “wake her up” as she typed out his scripts. 
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“but that great thing about the situation is that … honestly nobody knows. Nobody has the 
faintest idea. And perhaps it’s a matter of time, and one day perhaps we’ll understand how 
conscious emerges from hundred billion neurons in the skull… or maybe we’ll never know 
because our particular brand of logic doesn’t fit well with the deep explanation of consciousness” 
(Stoppard, Interview with Hytner). 
EVOLUTION AND COLLATERAL DAMAGE 
Jerry is aware of the questionable nature of his motives, and is completely unfazed by it. In fact, 
he is so hungry for a lucrative deal that he will go to any lengths to secure one. Amal, who has a 
degree in mathematics and biophysics is not trained to be a businessman, and despite enjoying 
the monetary benefits of his new job, he cannot knowingly take advantage of gullible investors. 
Due to this ideology, he advised a client to make a wise deal that was deemed financially 
pessimistic and lost KGB a lot of money. After causing Amal to nearly faint, Jerry makes him 
sign a contract forcing him to “share [his] limp-dick, short the market wisdom with nobody 
except [his] advisor – with a sign around [his] neck saying ‘Arsehole’”, which begs the question: 
who is the real ‘Arsehole’? (33) Amal was absolutely correct in guessing that because the 
“market is acting stupid, and the models are out of whack,” the market was in danger of getting 
shorted (33). Stoppard was anticipating the collapse of the housing market, and even though he 
wanted to prevent it, Amal was contractually bound to keep his mouth shut while “a lot of people 
were selling fire insurance on a house that was burning” (74). Subsequently, the question that 
leaps to mind is, who is the bigger miscreant: Bo or Jerry? Which further raises questions as to 
whether the punishment meted out to her (or Hilary) is justified while Jerry simply got to amass 
a greater wealth. Much like the arguments between Spike and Hilary that Stoppard leaves on a 
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caesura, this is an open-ended question with respect to morality and survival that the audience is 
expected to reflect on.  
Even as she spends her time studying innate versus acquired morality, Hilary is never 
free from the clutches of her own conscience regarding her unknown daughter. In a way, Hilary 
is the product of choices that Elizabeth Hapgood didn’t make: both women live with regret, but 
Hilary’s sorrow at giving up her child far surpasses Hapgood’s for choosing the professional 
over the personal. The prayers that Hilary says every night are for Catherine’s well-being.  
On Cathy’s sudden appearance in her office, Hilary receives a sudden jolt as she is 
reminded of her own daughter, and feels excruciatingly guilty about having “gone weeks without 
thinking of Catherine. Months. [She’d] been letting her go, as though [she’d] swapped her for a 
doctorate” (44). Hilary gets misty eyed every time she hears firecrackers, and the main reason for 
her anguish is the helplessness she feels in the situation. Stoppard drops several hints during the 
course of the narrative – such as Cathy’s exaggerated boredom slump that was obviously 
inherited – to indicate her relationship to Hilary. Hilary does entertain the sneaking suspicion 
that Cathy could be the same as her thirteen-year-old Catherine, but her suspicions would never 
have been confirmed unless her paper had caught Jerry’s eye and seemed inaccurate.  
Leo  (beat) Jerry said the paper was wrong. 
Hilary  He read it? 
Leo  It pissed him off that his daughter’s group scored low on nice and high on not so 
nice. He said Cathy was the nicest person in his family. 
Hilary  You’d think Jerry would approve of a bit of egoism in his genes. 
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Leo  His genes don’t come into it – Cathy’s adopted.      
       (Stoppard, The Hard Problem, 71) 
This news comes as a massive relief for Hilary, and egoistic motives or not, Hilary’s entire 
reason for studying altruism and nature-nature convergence is an attempt to dispel the 
uncertainty that surrounds the character of her daughter and the treatment she most receives from 
her foster parents. The play reaches a poignantly dramatic denouement as Jerry hands Cathy’s 
security pass to her biological mother before she quits the Krohl. In a way, although the scientific 
malpractice marked the end of Hilary’s career as a psychologist, it was a liberating factor that to 
her felt “like the first day of spring” and led to her wholeheartedly pursuing the hard problem of 
consciousness (75). 
1 4 
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CONCLUSION 
Stoppard could not have chosen more unique locations than an old aristocratic country 
home, the British secret service, and a neuroscience lab as the setting for his three science plays. 
The central tenets of each are radically different, and yet common themes weave their way 
through the labyrinths of abstract scientific concepts and complicated human relationships that 
are depicted in them. The more superficial ones would be those that compare features of each of 
the characters, such as Hilary and Hapgood both being mothers whose lives are inextricably tied 
to that of their child. In the same vein, Valentine explaining esoteric concepts in modern math 
and physics is similar to the Kerner figure in Hapgood filtering all of quantum mechanics 
through spy analogy.  
However, it seems that Stoppard revisits bigger questions that he either left unanswered 
or warranted more stage time. In her 2013 essay, Kelly mentions that Stoppard’s “later work has 
not only extended his previous preoccupation with memory, uncertainty and ethics, but also 
deepened the sense of human consequence growing from ethical conflict and intellectual doubt” 
and The Hard Problem is an embodiment of this extension (“Introduction: Tom Stoppard in 
Transformation”,10). Stoppard mentions that his preoccupation with morality and altruism 
stretches back to at least as far Jumpers wherein “the main character [George Moore] was a 
moral philosopher” wrestling with himself on the issue ‘Is God?’ (Stoppard, Interview with 
Hytner). Meanwhile, Moore’s wife is in the other room cradling the body of a dead gymnast. In 
addition to the distress caused by the death, she is extremely harrowed by NASA’s (in this case a 
British agency’s) moon landing, and is depicted as watching footage of an astronaut who left his 
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colleague to die1. The similarity to The Hard Problem is uncanny, although the newer play 
engages with other aspects of metaphysics and human behavior in greater detail. 
Arcadia features an engagement with the ethics of conducting research, and considered 
alongside The Hard Problem, Bernard, Hannah, Jerry, and Bo cover all the permutations of 
things that could possibly go awry during the course of an experiment. Hannah initially 
formulates the wrong hypothesis, as does Bernard, but he is blind to contradictory evidence, 
while Jerry and Bo both rig their experiments to get the results they want. It is highly interesting 
to note that the motives for each of them differ. Hapgood on the other hand explores ethical 
behavior outside the sterile situation of a lab, with almost all the characters indulging in selfish 
behavior to achieve their personal ends. In fact, their behavior serves to undermine Hilary’s 
conviction of goodness because although she is possibly the only person who acts remotely 
selflessly and resigns from her job, the characters in Hapgood establish that real life is different 
from simulated experiments.  
Of course, this conclusion clashes horribly with Kerner’s perspective on life because his 
method for validating behavior resides in the subatomic world. However, his outlook has ample 
backing in the message of non-linearity that Arcadia advocates for, and Hilary embodies in her 
openness to possibilities. Most importantly, all three plays value the concept of uncertainty and 
the belief that determinism isn’t always an option. Mathematical models fail because real data is 
noisy, “like a piano in the next room, it’s playing your song but unfortunately it’s out of whack,” 
and Amal echoes Valentine when he says “every now and then, the market’s behavior becomes 
irrational, as though it’s gone mad, or fallen in love. It doesn’t compute” (Stoppard, Arcadia 66, 
                                                 
1 This is an exhibition of self-interested behavior. Interestingly Stoppard inverted events that took place during a 
south pole expedition wherein explorer Scott “sacrificed his life to save the other members of his team” i.e. an act of 
pure altruism (Kelly, Tom Stoppard and the Craft of Comedy 98). 
56 
 
The Hard Problem 68). Attempting to write an algorithm to describe the ordinary or the 
extraordinary is a noble endeavor: one which scientists, philosophers, and artists have been 
pursuing in one way or another for centuries. Stoppard houses an ambivalence as to whether it 
can be done. Regardless, there is one issue on which he holds his ground: obstinately and 
narrow-mindedly clutching on to a belief does not lead to the answer. 
Writing about Hapgood, Katherine Kelly describes Kerner as taking “a scientific 
approach to the art of spying and an artful approach to science” (Tom Stoppard and the Craft of 
Comedy,152). Just as Stoppard writes himself into the character of Henry in The Real Thing,2 he 
imbues his technique of reconstructing science in an artistic context into his character of Kerner. 
Kerner has a charming manner of relating words to quantum physics, and in turn physics to 
human behavior. Stoppard operates with the same precision of a scientist, breaking down 
concepts into threads that can be traversed, only to eventually tie them up in a complex web of 
interaction that presents human behavior in a different light. An artist with a holistic grasp of 
science and its relatability to the world, Stoppard exploits his very assets to contribute uniquely 
to the thespian world. His ability to weave magic is heightened by the presence of a few loose 
strands of ideas, because he picks them up at a later point and proceeds to seamlessly explore 
hitherto unconceived premises. 
Uncertainty is the baggage accompanying any scientific endeavor, and Stoppard 
introduces the concept in the first of the three plays, takes advantage of its analogous scientific 
principle in the second, and has the third play completely revolve around it, as he relates 
uncertainty to human behavior in increasing amounts. Through his characters who either blunder 
                                                 
2 Henry is a playwright who weaves magic with words and treats dialogue like a well-designed cricket bat, but treats 
love and fidelity with cynicism and perplexity. Stoppard wrote the play shortly after his divorce, and there are 
several autobiographical elements in the play concerning vulnerability to love.  
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through, or embrace any setbacks to their progress, Stoppard exhibits that the only way forward 
is through rigorous scientific practices of asking questions and interpreting answers. His outlook 
on life is mirrored in his methodology, and this is what lends Stoppard his unique flavor as a 
genius.  
In that respect, Stoppard closely resembles Douglas Hofstadter3 who distils the art from 
mathematics and conversely draws attention to the intricate mathematics within art. Even though 
it is the third play that introduces the incompleteness theorem proposed by Kurt Gödel, the 
recurrence relations, self-reference and self-similarity that make up the structure of Arcadia 
embodies his mathematics. The word usage and doubling employed in Hapgood undoubtedly 
mirrors M.C Escher’s dizzying and brain numbing illustrations and optical illusions wherein a 
single element represents more than one thing.4 A different kind of artist, J.S. Bach was not only 
famous for his improvised composition of utterly complex fugues but also for his spirituality and 
engagement with the metaphysical.5 He serves as the perfect analogy for The Hard Problem 
where musical notes building up towards a symphony parallel neural architecture leading to the 
formation of a thought, and the sublimity of musical experience parallels the magic of linguistic 
metaphor.  
In Arcadia, Hapgood, and The Hard Problem, questions about the human mind, morals, 
and behavior get compactly condensed, weaving their way through the forever growing mesh of 
scientific theory, making significant headway in shedding light on people and their relation to the 
natural world. With an “extraterritorial perfection” of words and a delicate execution of 
                                                 
3 Author of Gödel, Escher, Bach an Eternal Golden Braid, Hofstadter uses a Lewis Carroll-ian approach to 
explicating how the underlying concepts of the works of the mathematician (Gödel), artist (Escher) and composer 
(Bach) are structurally similar and interconnected, and how the concept of infinity combined with tropes endorsed 
by each of these three pillars build a foundation to the contemporary world.  
4 Figure 3 M.C. Escher's Sky and Water I, Birds and Fish doubled by a "trick of the light." 
5 Wilfred Meller’s Bach and the Dance of God is a thorough, if somewhat inaccurate, interpretation of Bach’s music 
in religious, philosophical and psychological terms. 
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speculative dialectic, Tom Stoppard writes three brilliant plays, which together form an Eternal 
Golden Braid (James, 70). 
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ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 
Figure 1 An algorithm iterated ten thousand times to produce a self-similar leaf 
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Figure 2 The Seven Bridges of Kongsberg, solved by Leonard Euler. Kerner says: "Imagine nutcrackers with one bridge across 
the handles and one across the hinge and four bridges on to the island which would be a walnut if you were cracking walnuts" 
 
 
Figure 3 M.C. Escher's Sky and Water I, Birds and Fish doubled by a "trick of the light"
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